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Corporate governance and post bankruptcy reorganisation 
performance: Evidence from Thailand 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This research investigates the role of key corporate governance mechanisms in 
determining a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance following reorganisation.  
Design/ Methodology/ Approach – The study is based in agency theory and uses a unique 
sample of 111 filing companies whose reorganisation plans have been confirmed by the Thai 
Central Bankruptcy Court during the period 1999-2002. 
Findings – The results indicate that monitoring and incentive mechanisms are significant 
determinants of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. The key monitoring mechanism is 
ownership concentration, measured by shares held by the largest shareholder, whereas the critical 
incentive mechanisms are cash compensation and percentage of common shares held by the plan 
administrator. The results indicate that these mechanisms can mitigate agency problems in 
previously insolvent companies and increase post-bankruptcy performance over a three year 
period. 
Originality/ Value – The study is timely given that many organisations are facing rebuilding 
programs following the impact of the global financial crisis. Prior research in Thailand and 
elsewhere has not measured bankruptcy reorganisation outcomes in terms of the difference of 
actual financial performance to predicted performance and in relation to the governance factors of 
the reorganisation process. Neither has this aspect been considered within an agency theory 
framework. This provides a unique opportunity to consider these variables based on the 
theoretical framework of agency theory and to evaluate the importance of governance 
mechanisms in reorganisation proceedings.  
Keywords – agency theory, bankruptcy reorganisation, corporate governance, post-bankruptcy 
performance, Thailand 




        Reorganisation is an extensive alteration of a financially distressed firm’s capital, 
organisational and management structure following a plan worked out during the reorganisation 
proceedings under the bankruptcy law. The objectives of reorganisation are to eliminate the cause 
of the failure, settle with creditors and allow the firm to remain in business (Ross, Westerfield & 
Jordan, 2000). It enables firms to improve and continue their operations by providing several 
mechanisms for ensuring that these firms can emerge from bankruptcy adequately (Brigham & 
Houston, 2001; White, 1989).  
 The motivation for the study is to identify the governance settings which will lead to 
improved outcomes for restructuring firms, based on the theoretical framework of agency theory.  
This theory proposes that agency costs may be reduced by identifying cost effective mechanisms 
to encourage managers to serve the firm owners’ interests. A number of monitoring and incentive 
mechanisms are proposed which are hypothesised to minimize these costs, including outside 
representation on the oversight board and pay incentives to the manager. The study also serves as 
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a useful measure of the effectiveness of the recently instituted Thai bankruptcy reorganisation 
process. 
 The remainder of the paper is divided into 4 sections. Section 2 describes the relevant 
literature, including that specific to the Thai bankruptcy reorganisation process and its key 
governance mechanisms. Section 3 develops an agency theory consistent model which outlines 
the governance settings which will theoretically contribute to reorganisation success. Section 4 
outlines the empirical analysis and section 5 presents the conclusion and policy implications 




Prior studies into bankruptcy reorganisation have been undertaken in both Thailand and other 
countries. 
 
Studies in countries other than Thailand 
 
An extensive review of the literature of relevance to this study in countries other than 
Thailand can be classified into three broad areas of research. These are: measures of success in 
the bankruptcy reorganisation process, the critical factors influencing successful bankruptcy 
reorganisation, and more specifically the critical governance factors influencing successful 
bankruptcy organisation.  
Research into measures of success in the bankruptcy reorganisation process have been 
undertaken by Hotchkiss, 1995; Alderson and Betker, 1999; Daily, 1995; Platt and Platt, 2002; 
Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian, 2007; Jayaraman, Sabherwal and Shrikhande, 2001. These studies 
included the percentages of firms emerging from bankruptcy, categories of emerging firms 
(successful reorganisation, partially successful reorganisation, and mergers and acquisitions), 
accounting performance, cash flow performance compared with financial projections of the 
reorganisation, and stock performance. The evidence, particularly for those which filed for US 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisation, showed that a majority of firms either failed or continued 
to exhibit poor performance for some years following reorganisation.  
Critical factors influencing successful bankruptcy reorganisation have been researched by 
Frank & Torous, 1989; Gertner & Scharfstein, 1991; Chatterjee, Dhillon & Ramirez, 2004; Chen, 
2003; Fisher & Martel, 2003; Michel, Shaked & McHugh, 1998; Platt & Platt, 2002; Datta & 
Iskandar-Datta, 1995; Dawley, 1999; Routledge & Gadenne, 2000; White, 1994; Chen, Weston 
& Altman, 1995; Fayez and Meyer, 2001;   Dhillon, Noe & Ramirez, 1995; John, John & 
Vasudevan, 2000; Triantis, 1993; Denis and Rodgers, 2007;  Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback, 
2000; Dawley, Hoffman & Lamont, 2002; Denis & Rodgers, 2002; Berkovitch and Israel, 1991. 
These studies included the recontracting process, debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, 
management changes, a firm’s profitability, financial and operational projections in the 
reorganisation plan, refocusing and restructuring strategy, and the efficiency of insolvent firms. 
Evidence confirms that some of these mechanisms (i.e. DIP financing, restructuring strategy) are 
helpful for renegotiating with creditors, increasing the efficiency of investment decisions and 
enhancing bankruptcy recovery.  
Researchers concerned with the critical governance factors influencing successful 
bankruptcy reorganisation were Daily, 1995; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales & Kesner, 
1994, Brockmann, 1997; Brockmann, Hoffman, Dawley & Fornaciari, 2004; Hotchkiss, 1995; 
Daily, 1996; Charitou, Lambertides & Trigeorgis, 2007; Chen, 2003. These studies included 
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board size, board composition, the structure of chief executive officer (CEO) - board chairperson 
positions, CEO and director turnover, equity ownership, and audit committee. Among them, the 
crucial governance factors influencing successful bankruptcy reorganisation tend to be outside 
directors in the board, board leadership structure and CEO power.  
 
Studies in Thailand 
 
To date, only three research studies about formal methods of corporate workout have been 
conducted. The first research was the study of Vongvipanond, Jumpa and Wichitaksorn (2002) 
regarding systematic analysis and empirical evidence of court - supervised corporate restructuring 
in Thailand in terms of economic and legal perspectives. The second study was undertaken by 
Pipatsitee, Kuldilouk and Ekukara (2003), at the Center for Applied Economics Research, 
Faculty of Economics, Kasetsart University, Thailand. They extended the first piece of research 
concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of the Thai bankruptcy court in terms of managing 
and controlling debt restructuring proceedings comparing it with the Corporate Restructuring 
Group, Bank of Thailand and the Thai Asset Management Corporation. The third study by 
Pipatsitee, Kuldilouk, Ekukara and Kuntong (2004) extended previous research by examining 
ways for law development and the development of the law enforcement to improve debt 
restructuring efficiency. It was found that only the first, the research of Vongvipanond et al. 
(2002) investigated the implementation of the reorganisation plan and a firm’s post-bankruptcy 
performance, finding a 49% recovery rate during the period 1998-2002.  
 
Summary of the Literature 
 
The above literature review indicates that prior research in Thailand and elsewhere has not 
measured bankruptcy reorganisation outcomes in terms of the difference of actual financial 
performance to predicted performance and in relation to the governance factors of the 
reorganisation process. This gap in prior research provides a unique opportunity to consider these 
variables based on the theoretical framework of agency theory and to evaluate the importance of 
governance mechanisms in reorganisation proceedings. The model provided by agency theory, 
widely adopted in studies of governance and performance in ‘going concern’ companies, has also 
not been applied to reorganising companies. The motivation for the study is therefore to identify 
the governance settings which will lead to improved outcomes for restructuring firms, based on 
the theoretical framework of agency theory. The study also serves as a useful measure of the 
effectiveness of the recently instituted Thai bankruptcy reorganisation process. 
 
The Thai bankruptcy reorganisation process 
 
 The following contains a review of the Thai bankruptcy reorganisation process to outline 
the administration process and key governance mechanisms included.  The Bankruptcy Court in 
Thailand opened on June 18, 1999 after the National Assembly passed an amended 1940 
Bankruptcy Act and approved the establishment of special bankruptcy courts in March 1998 
(Debt Restructuring Regimes in Thailand, n.d.; Urapeepatanapong, Sethsathira & Okanurak, 
1998). New reorganisation provisions were included in the Act which aimed to deal with the 
economic fallout from the Asian economic crisis in 1997.  The new Bankruptcy Act included 
elements of the US bankruptcy code’s Chapter 11, British insolvency law and the Singapore 
Companies Act regarding Judicial Management (Pornavalai, 1998; Urapeepatanapong et al., 
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1998). Being similar to Chapter 11, the revised Act was targeted to provide an opportunity to 
economically distressed companies to restructure their assets, operations, liabilities, and other 
obligations. The amendment was designed to encourage creditors and debtor companies to 
cooperate in maintaining future viability of debtor companies.  
 The process commences with the filing of a petition for reorganisation to the court. The 
petition will be accepted if the person who petitions for reorganisation is: 1) a creditor(s) to 
whom the debtor owes at least 10 million Thai Baht, 2) an insolvent debtor owing creditor(s) at 
least 10 million Baht, 3) the Bank of Thailand, Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Insurance Department and certain other government agencies being responsible for overseeing 
the operations of the debtor. After examining the facts, the court will decide whether to order a 
business reorganisation and appoint a plan preparer or dismiss the petition.  
 Once the court orders reorganisation, proceedings commence and an automatic stay comes 
into effect. The debtor may no longer manage the business but the firm can continue business 
operations under the governance mechanisms of the reorganisation process. Shareholders will 
retain only the right to dividend payments. The court will appoint an interim manager to act 
under the official receiver’s supervision until the planner is appointed. When a planner is 
appointed, powers to manage the business and shareholder rights will be vested in the planner. 
The planner may be any person, company or committee nominated by the petitioner (the debtor 
or the creditor) and approved by the court.  
 On appointment, the planner has five months to prepare a reorganisation plan for approval 
by the creditors’ and confirmation by the Bankruptcy Court. In the reorganisation plan, the 
Bankruptcy Act only specifies broad requirements of the plan (section 90/42). They comprise 
reasons for the reorganisation, details of the debtor’s assets, guidelines and methods for 
reorganisation, and releases of the security of secured creditors. Moreover, the reorganisation 
plan must involve guidelines for the transfer of rights of claim, a period of implementation not 
exceeding five years, and the name and qualifications of the plan administrator including 
creditors’ approval of the plan. The plan must be able to show to the court that reorganisation 
value exceeds liquidation value. 
 When the court issues an order accepting the reorganisation plan, it will appoint a plan 
administrator who has rights and duties pursuant to section 90/59 of the Bankruptcy Act. The 
plan administrator may be any person, company, or committee nominated by the planner, 
accepted by the creditors and approved by the court. Once the court appoints the administrator, 
the duties of the planner immediately pass to the plan administrator who must manage the 
debtor’s business in accordance with the plan until reorganisation of the debtor’s business 
operations is achieved.  
 During the implementation of the approved plan, the creditors may pass a resolution at a 
meeting to appoint a committee of creditors to monitor and give guidance to the plan 
administrator. The plan administrator must manage the debtor firm following the plan; 
continuously report the progress of its implementation to a creditor committee and to the official 
receiver. The plan administrator effectively acts as a board of directors to implement the 
reorganisation plan, while the existing management team of an insolvent firm continues to 
manage the day to day business.  
If the plan administrator or the official receiver believes that reorganisation has been 
completed, they may request the court to order the cancellation of the business reorganisation. It 
should be noted that the success of the process is directly related to the reorganisation plan and its 
implementation. Two positions are critical to this success: firstly the Planner as the 
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person/committee who proposes the plan and secondly the Plan Administrator who implements 
the plan.  
 
The key control mechanisms in the process 
 
 There are several control mechanisms set up by Chapter 3/1 of the Thai Bankruptcy Act to 
govern firms during the reorganisation process. The key mechanisms are: 
 The planner: The planner has the duty to prepare a firm’s formal reorganisation plan 
within five months and manage the debtor firm during the time the plan is being proposed. The 
planner may be any person, company or committee nominated by the petitioner (the debtor or the 
creditor) and approved by the court. Their duties commence upon the court’s order for business 
reorganisation and finish when the court approves the plan. 
 The reorganisation plan: The plan which is prepared by the planner must be accepted by 
75% of the creditors voting at a creditors’ meeting. It must contain all the information required in 
Section 90/42 such as reasons for the reorganisation, details of the debtor’s assets, guidelines and 
methods for reorganisation, and name and qualifications of the plan administrator including the 
creditor’s approval of the plan. When the court issues an order accepting the reorganisation plan, 
it will be used as guidelines for the plan administrator for managing the reorganised firm.  
 The plan administrator: The plan administrator may be any person, company, or 
committee nominated by the planner, accepted by the creditor voting and approved by the court. 
The appointment, tenure, qualifications and compensation of the plan administrator are 
specifically contained in the plan. Once the court approves the plan and appoints the plan 
administrator, their duties commence and the duties of the planner immediately pass to them. 
They must manage the debtor’s business in accordance with the plan until reorganisation of the 
debtor’s business operations is achieved. In addition, a remuneration package such as cash 
compensation and equity shareholding for the plan administrator is specified in the plan.   
 The next section presents agency theory consistent hypotheses to test the impact of 
governance settings on post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
An agency theory based governance model for post-bankruptcy reorganisation 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a theory of the firm based 
upon conflicts of interest between principals (owners) and agents (managers).  More broadly 
Hatch (1997) proposes that in a business setting, the principals are represented by owners, 
shareholders or other stakeholders, such as potential investors and creditors, and the agents are 
professional managers.  Such managers are hired to act as agents for the owners, to make 
decisions on their behalf and to pursue organizational objectives which maximize corporate 
value. However, such agents are assumed to have their own interests which diverge from those of 
the owners and other stakeholders, leading to agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency costs are defined as the sum of monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring costs are expenditures paid by the 
principal/shareholders to directly monitor the behaviour of managers and may include the costs of 
internal and external audit and oversight by the board of directors. Bonding costs are incentives 
such as pay and equity holdings given to agent/managers to align their interests with those of the 
owners. Monitoring and bonding costs are never fully effective due to difficulties in measuring 
outputs and information asymmetry (i.e. managers’ access to detailed information which is 
unavailable to the owners) giving rise to a residual loss (Godfrey & Hill, 1995).  
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The main objective of agency theory research is to identify cost effective mechanisms to 
encourage managers to serve the firm owners’ interests (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997). 
Numerous prior studies attempted to understand agency problems and seek a number of effective 
mechanisms to reduce these costs (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Keasey et al., 1997; Fosberg & 
Rosenberg, 2003 and Core, Guay & Verrecchia, 2003). Monitoring methods include the use of a 
board of directors to provide guidelines or to directly supervise managers including evaluating 
their performance (Hatch, 1997) and the use of information systems such as a cost accounting 
systems, budget systems and other formal reporting to the owners or board of directors (Baiman, 
1990). Incentive mechanisms include the use of incentive based pay, which directly links the 
rewards paid to managers with those of the shareholders (examples include the use of options and 
share rewards). 
        Under the Thai Bankruptcy Act, the planner and plan administrator are the key governance 
mechanisms of the reorganisation process. The planner and plan administrator may be a person, 
company or group of persons and also may be insiders (company executives) or outsiders 
(shareholders only). There are no regulations limiting the number of planners and plan 
administrators, their composition or their remuneration.   
 
Outside directors in the Planner and Plan Administrator 
 
        Fama (1980) and Fama & Jensen (1983) suggest a board with a high proportion of outside 
directors is more likely to perform its duties in monitoring business management effectively. 
There are a number of empirical studies which have supported this conclusion. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) explored the relationships between board composition and corporate financial 
performance for a 266-firm sample between 1970 and 1980. The measure of financial 
performance selected was calculated by dividing the firm’s return on equity by the average return 
on equity for all the firms in its primary industry, including those not in the sample. A key 
finding was that the ratio of independent to inside directors (i.e. company executives) was higher 
in firms which had a performance above average than firms with a performance below average. 
        Westphal (1999) studied board effectiveness and firm performance and found similarly 
significant results in the survey data from 243 CEOs and 564 outside directors in April 1995. 
Westphal used two measures of firm performance: return on equity - ROE (an accounting-based 
measure) and the market-to-book value of equity - (a market-based measure) to investigate board 
involvement. The findings of this study suggested that board effectiveness may increase by 
encouraging collaboration between top managers and outside directors in strategic decision 
making. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) also found that a high proportion of inside directors on 
boards was associated with lower board involvement in strategic decision-making and a negative 
impact on firm performance.  
        Coles and Hesterly (2000) confirmed that there was a critical monitoring role for outside 
directors. They examined the independence of the chairman, board composition and shareholder 
value in the context of poison pill adoptions in 247 sample firms reported in the financial press 
during the period 1984-1986. They found that when leadership structure is not independent, the 
monitoring and control functions of outside directors are most important and most beneficial for 
shareholders. In a post bankruptcy reorganisation, Gales and Kesner (1994), Daily and Dalton 
(1994a, 1994b) and Daily (1995) also confirmed that outside directors on the board are more 
likely to be involved in improving post-bankruptcy performance. 
        The above studies support the effectiveness of an independent board, as represented by 
majority outside director membership, in guiding company management towards maximum 
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profitability. The application of this principle to firms undergoing reorganisation should improve 
their probability of success. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, a majority representation of outside directors in the Planner is positively 
associated with firm performance 
 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, a majority representation of outside directors in the Plan Administrator is 
positively associated with firm performance 
 
Ownership concentration  
 
Significant shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managerial activities as they 
are likely to receive substantial benefits from such monitoring (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Shleifer 
& Vishny 1986).  In owner-controlled firms, it would be expected that the owner’s substantial 
investment in the company would be manifested in a greater scrutiny of the executive and a 
reduction in the information asymmetries associated with a dispersed shareholding. 
Numerous empirical studies support the impact of concentrated ownership on reduced 
agency cost and improved profitability. Cubbin and Leech (1983) studied the effect of 
shareholder dispersion on the degree of control in British companies and found a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and profitability. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
studied large shareholders and corporate control and their findings from a sample of the Fortune 
500 firms confirmed that the greater the percentage of ownership, the higher expected profits. 
Wruck (1989) studied equity ownership concentration and firm value from private equity 
financings and concluded that increased concentrated ownership from private equity sales have a 
positive effect on a stock price. Oswald and Jahera (1991) explored the influence of ownership on 
performance controlling for firm size differences. Their findings show a significant effect of 
ownership concentration on financial performance as measured by excess stock returns. Bethel, 
Liebeskind and Opler (1998) investigate the consequences of block share purchases between 
1980 and 1989 using a sample of U.S. firms and found that return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for 
a firm’s operating performance improves in years two and three after the acquisition of large 
share blocks by activist shareholders.  
In Asia, Wiwattanakantang (1999) also studied the effect of ownership structure and 
corporate governance on performance. He used a sample of Thai firms and found that a firms’ 
major shareholders enhance profitability (ROA and Tobin’s Q) compared to firms with no 
controlling shareholders. Consistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999), the study of Suehiro (2001) 
on ownership patterns and corporate performance in Thailand found statistically significant 
relationships among them as measured by ROA and ROE. 
There have been some alternative findings. Lemmon and Lins (2003) studied the effect of 
ownership structure on changes in shareholder value during the East Asian financial crisis and 
found that the negative shock on the investment opportunities had raised the incentives for 
controlling shareholders to use corporate assets for their own interests. Furthermore, the large 
separation between cash flow ownership and control rights that arises from the use of a pyramidal 
ownership structure meant that corporate insiders have both the incentives and the abilities to 
engage in expropriation. Similarly, Hanazaki and Lin (2003) used data from the five East Asian 
crisis economies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in the period 1994-
2000 and studied the impact of corporate governance on the performance of firms. Their results 
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showed that ownership concentration had enabled controlling shareholders to expropriate other 
shareholders and was associated with significantly reduced performance.  
Setting aside these results from the period of Asian financial crisis, the majority of the 
literature finds support for an effect of ownership concentration on performance being positive 
and significant. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 






        Managerial remuneration including salary, profit-based bonus, and stock options are an 
efficient incentive mechanism to improve the goal alignment of shareholders and managers 
(Grant, 1998; Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998). Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggested that stock 
options, equity ownership, performance-related-pay and performance-related dismissals should 
be included as part of remuneration packages in order to provide financial incentives for 
management to make value-maximizing decisions. Numerous studies support the use of incentive 
mechanisms as an appropriate way to help shareholders encourage managers to pursue company 
goals (Baiman & Demski, 1980; Harrison, 2003).   
        Dyl (1988) examined listed firms in the Fortune 500 companies during 1982, and found that 
the levels of management compensation reduce the residual loss portion of agency costs. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) investigated the pay-performance relationship for chief executive officers 
(CEO) by using the data of the Forbes surveys from 1974 to 1986. In their analysis, they 
measured a regression of change in CEO salary and bonus on changes in net accounting income 
and found a statistically significant and positive relationship. Albeit, this empirical relation is 
small for a position in which incentive pay is expected to play an important role. Goldberg and 
Idson (1995) also tested the performance effects of executive remuneration, using data from the 
listed firms of Fortune 500 companies during the period 1980-1981. Their results which are 
consistent with Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) study and indicate that there was a significant 
agency effect on executive pay, though the total magnitude of the effect appears to be small, 
relative to company assets. Similarly, Mehran (1995) examined the executive compensation 
structure of randomly-selected small and large manufacturing firms 1979-1980 and found 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the form of compensation and firm value. The 
findings showed that the form, rather than the level, in particular equity-based compensation can 
motivate managers to increase firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and by return on assets 
(ROA).  Fosberg and Rosenberg (2003) also investigated agency cost control mechanisms. Their 
results suggested that share ownership by the firm’s CEO is one of the effective mechanisms in 
controlling a firm’s agency costs.  
        In the Thai reorganisation process, cash compensation for the plan administrator is specified 
in the reorganisation plan. Evidence from empirical studies in the literature generally confirms a 
positive link between executive remuneration and performance of the firms. Thus, it is possible to 
hypothesize that managerial remuneration (particularly that portion directly linked to 
performance through equity holdings) for the plan administrator is likely to be related to the 




H3a: Ceteris paribus, the level of cash remuneration awarded to members of the 
Plan Administrator will be positively associated with firm performance 
  
H3b: Ceteris paribus, the level of equity holding by the Plan Administrator will be 





Sample used for analysis 
 
The sample includes all companies which filed petitions for Chapter 3/1 bankruptcy under 
the Thai Bankruptcy Act and whose plans have been confirmed by the bankruptcy court between 
January 1999 and December 2002. The primary investigation found that 111 private sector 
companies had met the selection criteria of owing creditor(s) at least 10 million Baht and having 
their reorganisation plans accepted by the bankruptcy court (Table I). Missing data arising from 
non-disclosure of profit results reduced the final sample to 101. 
             
Table I. 














The study employs ordinary least squares regression to investigate the effect of governance 




                 +β5(SHPLAD)+β6(ORSTR)+β7(ARSTR)+β8(FRSTR)+ β9(LNSIZE) 
                 +β10(INDSTR)+β11(TYPE) +ε 
      Where: 
PFOM  = The three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before tax 
and predicted profits before tax as a percentage of the absolute value of  predicted 
profits before tax in Years 1-3  
Year 
(that plans were 
accepted by the court) 
Total No. of firms 
each year 
1999 1 (0.9%) 
2000 16 (14.4%) 
2001 48 (43.2%) 
2002 46 (41.4%) 
Total 111 (100.0%) 
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OUTPLA  = The proportion of outside directors in the planner  
OUTPLAD  = The proportion of outside directors in the plan administrator 
OWNER  = The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder of the firm 
LNCAPLAD  = The natural log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan administrator  
SHPLAD  = The percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator 
ORSTR  = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise 
ARSTR  = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise 
FRSTR  = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for financial restructuring or 0 otherwise 
LNSIZE  = The natural log of the total assets in the firm   
INDSTR  = Types of industry; 1 for manufacturing, 0 for others  
TYPE   = Types of company; 1 for public company, 0 for private company 
 
Consistent with previous research this study evaluates a firm’s performance in the first 
three years of reorganisation (Michel et al. 1998; Alderson & Betker 1999). Adapted from 
Hotchkiss’s (1995) and Platt & Platt’s (2002) study, the dependent variable (PFOM) is measured 
in terms of the difference of actual from projected performance. The measure is the three-year 










 n  = Years 1-3 during the reorganisation time 
 Xi  = {(APBTi - PPBTi)/ |PPBTi|} x 100 
 APBT = Actual profits before tax 
 PPBT  = Predicted profits before tax 
 
The three-year predicted and actual profits before tax are disclosed in the reorganisation 
plans of insolvent firms which were collected in bankruptcy reorganisation filings within the 
database of the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court. In some cases, the progress reports did not 
contain all the data necessary for the study and additional data was sourced from financial 
statements of firms from the database of the Department of Business Development, the Ministry 
of Commerce, Thailand, and financial information of listed firms from the database of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. 
The measurement of independent variables is consistent with that adopted by previous 
studies. The proportion of outside directors in the planner (OUTPLA) and plan administrator 
(OUTPLAD) was used to measure the influence of outside directors on firm performance (Gales 
and Kesner, 1994; Daily & Dalton, 1994b; Daily, 1995, Florakis and Ozkan, 2009). For 
ownership concentration (OWNER), the study employs the proportion of common shares held by 
the largest shareholder of the firm (Prowse, 1992; Claessens et al., 2002). Cash compensation 
(LNCAPLAD) is the cash remuneration of the plan administrator (Dyl, 1988; Goldberg & Idson 
1995; Evans et al., 2002). Managerial shareholding (SHPLAD) is the percentage of common 
shares held by the plan administrator and is applied as a proxy for equity based remuneration 
(Fosberg & Rosenberg, 2003; Mehran 1995).  
Control variables include firm size, industry and company type as they may be related to 
the ability of insolvent firms to achieve successful reorganisation and improved post-bankruptcy 
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performance (Gales & Kesner, 1994). Firm size (LNSIZE) is commonly applied by researchers in 
this field (Hotchkiss, 1995; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Fayez & Meyer, 2001 and Dahiya et al. 
2003). In this study it is measured by the natural log of the book value of total assets, as of the 
date of the court issued order for reorganisation, in million Baht.  Industry type (INDSTR) is 
represented by a dummy variable depicting manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups. 
Research by the Economic Indicator Section, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand 
(Siksamat, 1999) confirmed the importance of this grouping in Thailand following the economic 
crises of 1997. In their results, the Business Sentiment Index (BSI) - indicated that firms in the 
manufacturing sector performed better relative to the non-manufacturing sector. Finally, the 
sample contains both public and private companies which are differentiated through inclusion of 
a dummy variable (TYPE). Inclusion of this control variable is supported by a number of studies 
finding an impact of company type on firm value (Krause 1988; Kroll, Wright, Toombs & 
Leaveil, 1997; Poensgen & Thonet, 1979).  
As part of the reorganisation process, firms must submit information on restructuring 
efforts undertaken to the official receiver. The three major strategies identified were operational 
restructuring (ORSTR), asset restructuring (ARSTR) and financial restructuring (FRSTR) and 
these are also included as control dummy variables for this study. 
 
Univariate analysis and OLS regression test results 
 
Prior to regression testing, the dependent variable (PFOM), was subject to log transformation to 
correct for non-normality. OUTPLAD was omitted from the final model as it was highly 
correlated with OUTPLA (r=0.841). As all companies undertook financial restructuring (FRSTR) 
this variable was also removed. A Pearson correlation of the variables is shown in Table II. 
 
Table II. 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. LPFOM 1.00 
          2. OUTPLA -0.01 1.00 
         3. OUTPLAD -0.01 0.84** 1.00 
        4. OWNER 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 1.00 
       5. LNCAPLAD 0.19* 0.27** 0.34** -0.09 1.00 
      6. SHPLAD 0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.09* -0.19* 1.00 
     7. ORSTR -0.02 0.15 0.07 0.09 -0.08 0.20* 1.00 
    8. ARSTR 0.04 0.08* 0.17* -0.14 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 1.00 
   9. LNSIZE 0.13 0.20* 0.18* -0.33** 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.15 1.00 
  10. INDSTR -0.24** 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.20* -0.06 0.17 0.13 0.14 1.00 
 11. TYPE 0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.38** 0.10 -0.24** -0.14* 0.10 0.43** 0.06 1.00 
Notes: N = 101 companies. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-
tailed). LPFOM = Log of the three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before tax and predicted profits 
before tax as a percentage of the absolute value of  predicted profits before tax in Years 1-3. OUTPLA= Outside directors in the 
planner. OUTPLAD = Outside directors in the plan administrator. OWNER = The proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder of the firm. LNCAPLAD = Log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan administrator. SHPLAD = The 
percentage of common shares held by the plan administrator. ORSTR= Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 
otherwise. ARSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise. LNSIZE= The natural log of the total assets 
in the firm. INDSTR= Types of industry; 1 for manufacturing, 0 for others. TYPE= Types of company; 1 for public company, 0 
for private company. 
 
In the OLS regression analysis (Table III), cases with standardized residuals above + 3 
standard deviations are omitted as research suggests that these cases may unreasonably influence 
 12 
the accuracy of estimates (Field 2009), reducing the final sample size to 96. Tolerance and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) were tested and found no evidence of multicollinearity between 
the remaining independent variables. The explanatory power of the regression (adjusted 
r2=0.063) is consistent with previous studies investigating the effect of governance mechanisms 
on performance (for example, the studies of Mehran,1995; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; and Peng, 
2004).  
The regression findings in Table III indicate that there are three governance related 
variables that are influential in determining post-bankruptcy performance. Ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholder (OWNER), the log of cash compensation for the plan 
administrator (LNCAPLAD), and the common shares held by the plan administrator (SHPLAD) 
are found as positive and significant predictors at p < .10. The control variable, industry type, is 
also significant, with manufacturing industry having a negative effect on post-bankruptcy 
performance as measured by LPFOM.  
In contrast to the hypothesized relationship, the log of the proportion of outside directors 
in the planner (LNOUTPLA) is not significant. The restructuring methods adopted (ORSTR and 
ARSTR), firm TYPE (public or private) and size (LNSIZE) of company are also not a significant 
contributor to the performance of firms under reorganisation. 
 
Table III. 
Empirical results of predictors of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance as measured by the 
natural log of post-bankruptcy performance (LPFOM) 
 
Model: 
         LPFOM = α+β1(OUTPLA)+β2(OWNER)+β3(LNCAPLAD)+β4(SHPLAD) 
                          +β5(ORSTR)+β6(ARSTR)+β7(LNSIZE)+β8(INDSTR) + β9(TYPE)+ε                         
 
 
                        Variables          Hypothesis      Predicted sign    Coefficient       t-value       Significance  
          OUTPLA               H1a                    +                     0.000            -0.727             .235 
                        OWNER                 H2                     +                     0.002             1.713             .045**     
                        LNCAPLAD          H3a                    +                     0.009             1.663             .050* 
                        SHPLAD                H3b                    +                     0.002            1.301             .099* 
                        ORSTR                                                                   0.013             0.199             .843 
                        ARSTR                                                                   0.032             0.507             .614 
                        LNSIZE                                                                  0.035             1.375             .173 
                        INDSTR                                                                -0.141            -2.207             .030** 
                        TYPE                                                                      0.095             1.228             .223 
                        Intercept                                                                 7.620            39.517             .000   
   
F-value                      1.715*                        
R-square                    0.151                        
Adjusted R-square   0.063                   
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Notes: N = 96 sample companies. * is percent significance level < .10 (1-tailed). ** is percent significance level < ..05 (1-tailed). 
LPFOM = The natural log of the three-year average value of the difference between actual profits before tax and predicted profits 
before tax as the percentage of absolute value of predicted profits before tax in years 1-3; OUTPLA= The proportion of outside 
directors in the planner; OWNER= The proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder of the firm; LNCAPLAD = 
The natural log of amounts of cash compensation for the plan administrator; SHPLAD = The percentage of common shares held 
by the plan administrator; ORSTR = Dummy variable (1,0) 1 for operational restructuring or 0 otherwise; ARSTR = Dummy 
variable (1,0) 1 for asset restructuring or 0 otherwise; LNSIZE = The natural log of the book value of total assets in the firm; 




This paper reviewed previous research to develop hypotheses which outline the critical 
governance factors impacting on post-bankruptcy reorganisation performance in Thailand. The 
model is based in Agency Theory and suggests avenues for improving the performance of 
restructured companies by effective monitoring and incentive alignment of the managers of the 
restructuring process. The results indicate that monitoring and incentive mechanisms are 
significant determinants of a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance. The key monitoring 
mechanism is ownership concentration of common shares held by the largest shareholder (H2), 
whereas the critical incentive mechanisms are cash compensation (H3a) and the percentage of 
common shares held by the plan administrator (H3b). The results indicate that these mechanisms 
can mitigate agency problems in previously insolvent companies and increase post-bankruptcy 
performance over a three year period. 
Contrary to expectations the proportion of outside directors in the planner (H1a) is not 
significant. The restructuring methods adopted and firm type (public or private) are also not a 
significant contributor to the performance of Thai firms under reorganisation. 
From a theoretical perspective, the results support the efficacy of Agency Theory as a 
basis for studying governance arrangements in restructuring companies. Both monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms, proposed by agency theory as measures to control agency costs, are found 
to be significant in this context. From a practical perspective, the results confirm the importance 
of empirical testing prior to the implementation of regulations in this area, to ensure that 
prescribed governance arrangements are accountable and efficient. They provide guidance to the 
ideal composition of the Planner and Plan Administrator to enhance the chances of successful 
reorganisation. They propose that the court approved Planner and Plan Administrator would 
benefit by the inclusion of significant shareholders and the provision of a competitive 
remuneration packages to those serving on these boards, including a significant equity linked 
component. This would ensure proper monitoring of the reorganizing companies management by 
a board who will be motivated to maximize the returns to stakeholders.  It is argued that the 
facilitation of the above by either the enshrining in the Thai Bankruptcy Act, or less 
prescriptively through recommend codes of best practice, would assist in obtaining the best 
possible outcome for companies entering the reorganisation process. These lessons may similarly 
apply to other countries, although further research is necessary to confirm them in different 
country settings. 
 The research, which was restricted to the 1999-2002 period and to variables requiring 
disclosure by law, would also benefit by replication over a longer time period under different 
economic conditions and including other variables not considered. Further research into the 
efficacy of the various restructuring methods undertaking by firms would also provide interesting 
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